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Introduction
F or nearly a century, proponents of health reformhave advocated for greater clinical integration toimprove quality, promote efficiencies, and control
costs. A seminal 1932 report issued by the Committee
on the Costs of Medical Care called for the provision of
care through group practice arrangements as part of a
broader set of recommendations that included universal
coverage, extension of public health services to the en-
tire population, and a major investment in health pro-
fessions education. Resistance to its findings was a key
factor in convincing the Roosevelt Administration to
abandon national health insurance in the original Social
Security Act.1
The goal of clinical integration remains front and
center today, as the nation confronts the consequences
of a vastly larger and more complex medical care indus-
try that for decades has operated in a political and
policy environment willing to tolerate a high degree of
business autonomy, even as evidence of inefficiency,
waste, and poor quality has mounted.2 In the current
climate the stakes are much higher. Health expendi-
tures stand at approximately 15 percent of GDP and the
Congressional Budget Office projects that they will ex-
ceed 25 percent of GDP by 2035.3 Employer-sponsored
health insurance costs are rising at a rate that signifi-
cantly exceeds growth in worker pay even as coverage
shrinks; millions of workers and their families simply
do without. Congress is poised to debate the future of
Medicare and Medicaid, as well as the future of the Pa-
tient Protection and Affordable Care Act (the Afford-
able Care Act) and its financial commitment to afford-
ability tax credits for the uninsured. As insured Ameri-
1 Joseph S. Ross, The Committee on the Costs of Medical
Care and the History of Health Insurance in the United
States,’’ Einstein Quart. J. Biol. Med. (2002) 19: 129-134, at
130; Paul Starr, The Social Transformation of American Medi-
cine (Basic Books, N.Y., N.Y. 1982) Book Two.
2 David A. Hyman, Health Care Fragmentation: We Get
What We Pay For, The Fragmentation of U.S. Health Care:
Causes and Solutions (Einer Elhauge, ed.) Ch. 2; Thomas
Bodenheimer, Coordinating Care—A perilous Journey
Through the Health Care System, 358 New Eng. Jour. Med.
1064 (2008).
3 Douglas W. Elmsdorf, Economic Effects of the March
Health Legislation (2010) http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/119xx/
doc11945/USC10-22-10.pdf (Accessed May 2, 2011).
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cans watch their insurance coverage slowly
disintegrate, and as prospects for access by the unin-
sured are threatened with loss, the question of how to
move health care toward a more sensible organizational
and operational design grows more urgent.
The Affordable Care Act does not mandate system re-
design but does contain a series of provisions aimed at
setting this type of long term restructuring in motion.
Chief among the law’s restructuring elements is a move
toward greater clinical integration of the type that ex-
perts have long associated with efficiency and quality.4
The Affordable Care Act’s legislative tools for achieving
this result consist of a series of push/pull interventions
such as payment reforms and investments in prevention
and greater primary care access. Among these tools,
two have drawn the most attention, not only because of
their technical and legal complexity but because of their
aspirational qualities, as well. The first is the Medicare
Shared Savings Program (MSSP) whose purpose is to
slow program growth while achieving quality reforms
through the use of accountable care organizations
(ACOs).5 The second is the Center for Medicare and
Medicaid Innovation (CMI)6 whose mission is to spur,
and rapidly diffuse, advances in patient care, particu-
larly for higher cost populations.
Both strategies—the use of broad programmatic fi-
nancial incentives to achieve greater organizational and
operational integration, and direct investment in inte-
grated delivery pilots—represent two dimensions of the
same overarching goal. Indeed, the ACA essentially
treats the MSSP program through ACOs as a compan-
ion to the CMI, specifically barring ACO participation
by entities that participate in shared savings models ad-
ministered by the CMI, as well as the Independence at
Home medical pilot program.7 The CMI’s work will un-
fold through a series of pilots and demonstrations. The
MSSP, on the other hand, represents a major effort at
broad-based change in Medicare policy, and will be
implemented through regulations of general applicabil-
ity that ultimately will be more fully translated through
sub-regulatory guidance and the agreements developed
with participating ACOs.
The MSSP proposed rule published on April 7, along
with a series of companion policy statements, not only
sets out the legal standards that guide agency action but
also offers insight into broad policy direction. The task
of developing MSSP ACO policy was unusually chal-
lenging, because collectively these policies ultimately
will affect the entire health care market. Because of
Medicare’s influence on U.S. health policy, its rules for
ACO formation and operation will spill over into the in-
teraction between payers and health care providers
more generally, regardless of whether the relationship
is part of the self-insured and state-regulated commer-
cial market, the Medicaid market, or (ultimately) the
market for qualified health plans sold in state health in-
surance exchanges. Federal policies in the fields of an-
titrust enforcement, tax, and fraud and abuse will affect
all forms of coverage as well as the shape of the health
care system more generally. As new health care enter-
prises are formed, state laws governing the corporate
practice of medicine and the regulation of risk-bearing
health care entities will be drawn in as well. For these
reasons, the Administration’s collection of ACO-related
policies (in the form of proposed rules and policy state-
ments)8 has attracted unusually great attention from
the health care community.
Legislative Backdrop
It is helpful in understanding the major policy
choices made by the Administration in ACO implemen-
tation to step back and consider the legislative back-
drop against which this collection of policies has
emerged. The Affordable Care Act’s MSSP provisions
empower the Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices secretary not only to establish the program but to
waive Medicare law, as well as certain federal fraud and
abuse laws if necessary to implement the program.9 At
the same time, the Affordable Care Act did not alter an-
titrust law and doctrine but was enacted against a back-
drop of longstanding antitrust policies in the field of
health care. Similarly, the MSSP statute did not directly
alter tax laws and doctrines applicable to participation
in market enterprises by tax-exempt charitable entities;
instead, implementation takes place within the existing
legal framework. Thus, implementation of the MSSP
through ACOs can be expected to trigger a series of
downstream developments across many fields of law
that extend beyond Medicare.
The MSSP Statute
An ACO is essentially an enterprise that manages
health care operations and financial arrangements for
participating providers, with an eye toward improving
performance quality and operational efficiency.10 In an
ACO arrangement, a corporate entity, through its par-
ticipating providers, agrees to take responsibility for
managing practice costs and patient care, and in return,
participating providers can qualify for shared savings
flowing from improved performance and efficiency.
The MSSP statute contains extensive provisions regard-
ing payment models, ACO operational structure, man-
agement and governance, and federal management
powers. While the law is detailed, it also vests the HHS
Secretary with broad and non-reviewable authority
over implementation and key policy decisions. This
means that the Secretary has the power to resolve am-
4 Elliot Fisher, Mark McClellan, and John Bertko, Fostering
Accountable Health Care: Moving Forward in Medicare Health
Affairs 28:2 w219-w231 (January 2009); MedPAC, Accountable
Care Organizations, in Report to Congress: Improving Incen-
tives in the Medicare Program (June 2009).
5 SSA § 1899, added by PPACA § 3022.
6 SSA § 1115A, added by PPACA § 3021.
7 § 1899(b)(4), added by PPACA § 3022.
8 76 Fed. Reg. 19528. Also published on April 7 was a joint
Notice from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
and the Office of the Inspector General regarding waivers of
federal fraud and abuse laws in connection with the Medicare
Program and the Innovation Center. 76 Fed. Reg. 19655. Re-
lated materials were published separately. The Proposed State-
ment of Antitrust Enforcement Policy Regarding Accountable
Care Organizations Participating in the Medicare Shared Sav-
ings Program was published on April 19 (76 Fed. Reg. 21894).
A separate IRS Notice regarding the applicability of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code to tax exempt organizations participating in
the Medicare Shared Savings Program can be found at http://
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-11-20.pdf (Accessed May 11,
2011).
9 § 1899(f), added by PPACA § 3022.
10 See, e.g., Stephen Shortell, Lawrence Casalino, and Elliot
Fisher, Implementing Accountable Care Organizations (Berke-
leyLaw Policy Brief May 2010. p. 2.
2
5-16-11 COPYRIGHT  2011 BY THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC. HCPR ISSN 1068-1213
biguities raised by the statute itself (an inevitable con-
sequence of legislative policies whose implementation
is entrusted to agencies with policy and management
expertise).
ACO payment models. The statute specifies a basic
payment model; under this model ‘‘payments shall con-
tinue to be made to providers of services and suppliers
participating in an ACO under the original Medicare
fee-for-service program . . . in the same manner as they
would otherwise be made, except that a participating
ACO is eligible to receive payment for shared sav-
ings’’11 if its quality meets performance standards, and
estimated ACO expenditures for assigned patients fall
below an estimated spending benchmark developed by
the Secretary. In addition, the statute gives the Secre-
tary an ‘‘option to use other payment models’’ that the
Secretary deems appropriate, including a partial capita-
tion model as well as ‘‘any payment model that the Sec-
retary determines will improve the quality and effi-
ciency’’12 of care. The statute is ambiguous as to
whether ‘‘other payment models’’ chosen by the Secre-
tary are intended to supplement the basic approach or
can supplant the basic model altogether. This is crucial
for two reasons. First, the basic model is designed to
maintain the existing payment Medicare fee-for-service
payment structure while simply adding in a bonus; by
contrast, other models could be risk-based. Second, the
‘‘other payment model’’ approach is subject to budget
neutrality requirements that do not apply to the basic
payment system.13
ACO size and maturity. The statute specifies that
ACOs must have at least 5,000 beneficiaries assigned in
order to participate in the MSSP.14 In the Physician
Group Practice Demonstration program, 5,000 lives
were shown to translate into some 50 physicians, mak-
ing the ACO model established by Congress one that
envisions a group enterprise of considerable size. By
2004-2005, less than 5 percent of physicians practiced
in medical groups of 50 or greater;15 this means that
ACOs not built on single large practice groups will span
multiple independent practices in order to reach the re-
quired assigned patient threshold. This 5,000-patient
threshold for market entry also was a feature of earlier
Medicare HMO statute, suggesting that although the
MSSP statute contemplates payment arrangements not
tied to risk of loss, Congress nonetheless anticipated a
size sufficient to produce reliable estimates of both sav-
ings and loss.
Beyond size, the statute envisions entities that pos-
sess considerable capabilities. An ACO must have a le-
gal structure robust enough to engage in governance
and financial management, including the ability to re-
ceive and distribute shared savings, which in turn
means the existence of considerable financial manage-
ment capabilities. An ACO must also be able to imple-
ment quality and reporting requirements covering the
enterprise. Furthermore, an ACO, by statute, must be
able to govern, not merely implement. That is, the stat-
ute requires that an ACO ‘‘define processes to promote
evidence-based medicine and patient engagement, re-
port on quality and cost measures, and coordinate care
. . .’’ [emphasis added].16 Notably however, the ACO
statute does not designate the ability to manage finan-
cial risk as a core requirement.
Quality performance and reporting. The statute is
clear that however paid, ACOs cannot share in savings
unless their quality performance and reporting capabili-
ties meet tests established by the HHS secretary.17 At
the same time, the statute appears to envision an incre-
mental approach to quality performance, specifying
that the ‘‘Secretary shall seek to improve the quality of
care furnished by ACOs over time by specifying higher
standards, new measures, or both . . .’’18
ACO participation and beneficiary assignment. The
statute permits participation by a broad array of groups
of Medicare providers and suppliers; the law identifies
as ‘‘participants’’ ‘‘ACO professionals,’’ which in turn
are defined as physicians, physician assistants, clinical
nurse specialists, and nurse practitioners19 in both
group practices or as members of networks of indi-
vidual practices. The statute also encompasses hospi-
tals (either employing ACO professionals or in partner-
ship with them) and ‘‘such other groups of providers of
services and suppliers as the Secretary determines ap-
propriate.’’20
The statute accords the Secretary similarly broad dis-
cretion where patient assignment is concerned, direct-
ing her to ‘‘determine an appropriate method to assign
Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries to an ACO based
on their utilization of primary care services provided . . .
by an ACO professional described in
[§ 1899](h)(1)(A)’’21 [emphasis added].
The MSSP statute contains several important ambi-
guities requiring resolution. First, there is the apparent
disconnect between provider assignment and patient
participation. Where participation is concerned, the leg-
islation contemplates broad inclusion of health profes-
sionals beyond physicians; included in the participating
groups and individuals are all Medicare suppliers (in-
cluding federally qualified health centers and rural
health clinics) as well as physician assistants, nurse
practitioners, and clinical nurse specialists. At the same
time, the assignment provisions of the statute reference
one particular type of health care (i.e., primary care ser-
vices) and one particular provider class (physicians), ty-
ing assignment to how beneficiaries use primary care
‘‘provided by’’ physicians. The meaning that will be as-
cribed to both ‘‘primary care services’’ and ‘‘provide’’
thus becomes highly important. In addition, the statute
gives the Secretary broad powers to define how ‘‘as-
signment’’ works, with the authority to weigh the essen-
tial economic and performance dimensions of the
model against Medicare’s core freedom-of-choice guar-
antee, which avoids the choice-limiting effects of the
11 SSA § 1899(d), added by PPACA § 3022.
12 § 1899(i)(1)-(3).
13 Compare SSA § 1899(d), which does not address budget
neutrality, to § 1899(i) the other payment model authority, that
does contain two express budget neutrality provisions
(§ 1899(i)(2)(B) and § 1899(i)(3)(B)). See also, 76 Fed. Reg.
19533.
14 § 1899(b)(2)(D).
15 Allison Lieber and Joy Grossman, Physicians Moving to
Mid-Size Single Specialty Practices, Tracking Report #18
(Center for Studying Health Systems Change, 2007) http://
www.hschange.com/CONTENT/941/ (Accessed May 2, 2011).
16 § 1899(b)(2)(C).
17 § 1899(b)(3)(B) and (C).
18 § 1899(b)(3)(C).
19 § 1899(h)(1)(A) and (B).
20 § 1899(b)(1)(A)-(E).
21 § 1899(c).
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modern network approach to health insurance cover-
age that controls other markets.
Avoiding at risk patients. Whether through bonuses
or shared risk of loss, the ACO model incentivizes ex-
penditure reductions. In order to guard against cherry-
picking the healthiest patients, the statute gives the
HHS secretary power to sanction ACOs if she deter-
mines that the ACO has ‘‘taken steps to avoid patients
at risk in order to reduce the likelihood of increasing
costs to the ACO . . .’’22 The HHS secretary’s discretion
extends to both setting the method for determining
whether avoidance is taking place and fashioning the
sanction.
Administrative and judicial review. The statute limits
administrative and judicial review of virtually all major
aspects of the HHS secretary’s implementation of the
statute, thereby further augmenting her considerable
powers. The statute bars review of certain decisions,
whether under certain specified review authorities
within the Social Security Act, ‘‘or otherwise’’: specifi-
cation of quality performance standards; measurement
of ACO quality performance; Medicare beneficiary as-
signment; determinations of whether an ACO is eligible
for shared savings including determinations of esti-
mated expenditures for assigned beneficiaries and the
ACO’s average benchmark; the percent of shared sav-
ings and limits on such savings; and ACO termina-
tion.23
Antitrust, Fraud, and Tax Considerations
The statute explicitly anticipates the legal questions
related to federal fraud laws that can arise under an
ACO model, while remaining silent on the questions of
tax and antitrust law that ultimately surfaced as well.
Fraud. A series of federal laws are aimed at curbing
fraud and abuse in federal programs and carry implica-
tions for ACO formation and operation. The Physician
Self-Referral Law prohibits physicians from making re-
ferrals for Medicare ‘‘designated health services’’ to en-
tities with which they or their immediate family mem-
bers have a financial relationship, unless they are oper-
ating under an exception.24 The Anti-Kickback
Statute,25 imposes criminal penalties for individuals or
entities that knowingly and willfully offer, pay, solicit,
or receive remuneration to induce or reward the refer-
ral of business reimbursable under a federal health care
program. Violation of the statute also can result in the
imposition of civil money penalties, program exclusion,
and liability under the federal False Claims Act, since
every claim arising out of a kickback arrangement be-
comes implicated as a false claim.26 Finally, federal law
prohibits hospital payments to physicians to induce re-
duction or limitation in services (known as ‘‘gainshar-
ing’’).27 Over the years, the HHS Office of the Inspector
General and CMS have developed a series of safe har-
bors that, consistent with the laws themselves, recog-
nize certain exceptions to these general prohibitions,
thereby leading to the inclusion of express waiver au-
thority in the HHS secretary.28
Antitrust. While the original Medicare program oper-
ates as an administered payment system that does not
turn on price negotiation, ACOs can be expected to pur-
sue contracts in other markets where price negotiation
is the norm. The nation’s physicians have a long history
of opposition to insurance arrangements that threaten
their incomes and autonomy.29 Following the United
States Supreme Court’s landmark 1982 ruling against
what it judged to be per se unlawful price-fixing by phy-
sician cartels in Arizona v Maricopa County Medical
Society,30 the antitrust enforcement agencies have been
engaged in an extended effort to define what consti-
tutes permissible market conduct, as well as which
standard—the strict per se test or the more lenient ‘‘rule
of reason’’ test—will be used to reviewing medical care
joint ventures.31
Statements of Antitrust Enforcement Policy issued in
1994 and revised in 199632 allow avoidance of scrutiny
under the per se rule (which classifies certain types of
market conduct as illegal without further proof of anti-
competitve effects) in situations in which there exists
sufficient evidence of shared commitment to a common
enterprise so as to permit otherwise independent com-
petitors to negotiate with purchasers as a single entity.
The revised Statements recognize as falling within a
clear safety zone joint ventures that involve full finan-
cial integration (through, for example, a single global
payment to the venture). As modified in 1996, the State-
ments also recognize arrangements that lack financial
integration while possessing sufficient indicia of clinical
integration to promote quality and efficiency so as to
justify treatment as a single venture for price negotia-
tion purposes. Of particular importance in the latter in-
stance are accountability of a group’s members for
quality and efficiency, the threat of dismissal from the
group for substandard conduct, and the investment of
human and financial resources in a shared enterprise.33
Enforcement agency rulings on joint ventures issued
over the years suggest that the prior Statements may
have been broad enough to cover ACO formation and
operation.34 However, both during and following the
health reform debate, questions arose regarding the ex-
tent to which the existing Statements fully addressed
ACO scenarios. Furthermore, ACO proponents sought a
more streamlined approach to the oversight process in
order to speed and standardize resolution.
Tax exemption policy for nonprofit health care cor-
porations. Nonprofit entities that enjoy tax-exempt sta-
tus under the Internal Revenue Code are expected to
seek to become ACO participants; this is particularly
true for hospitals, three-quarters of which operate as
nonprofit corporations. As with antitrust concerns, the
applicability of existing tax policy to ACO formation
22 § 1899(d)(3).
23 § 1899(g).
24 SSA § 1877, 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn. See 76 Fed. Reg. 19656
(April 7, 2011).
25 SSA § 1128B.
26 76 Fed. Reg. 19657.
27 SSA § 1128A(b)(1) and (2), 76 Fed. Reg. 19657.
28 SSA § 1899(f), added by PPACA § 3302.
29 Thomas Greaney, Thirty Years of Solicitude: Antitrust
Law and Physician Cartels, 7 Hous. J. Health L. and Policy 189-
226 (2007) at 192-195.
30 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
31 Greaney, op. cit. note 30.
32 http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0000.htm
(Accessed May 5, 2011).
33 Taylor Burke and Sara Rosenbaum, Accountable Care
Organizations: Implications for Antitrust Policy (BNA Health
Law Reporter, March 11, 2010).
34 Id.
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and operation by charitable entities emerged as an im-
portant issue in the wake of passage of the Affordable
Care Act. This emergence took two forms. First, ques-
tions arose as to whether participation in ACOs might
expose a nonprofit corporation to loss of its § 501(c)(3)
tax-exempt status because shared savings could be un-
derstood as inuring to the benefit of private participants
or as a substantial activity not in furtherance of an or-
ganization’s charitable purposes. Second, questions
arose as to whether nonprofit entities would be liable
for taxes on ‘‘unrelated business income’’ as a result of
the shared savings realized from MSSP distributions.35
Key Elements of the CMS Proposed Rule
In implementing the MSSP program, CMS made a
number of policy decisions that have the potential to
carry considerable downstream effects.
Payment models. The CMS rule essentially jettisons
the statute’s basic payment model, which envisions cou-
pling Medicare Part A and B fee-for-service payments
with bonuses for savings and high quality performance.
In its place, the proposed rule establishes two payment
models both of which can be considered ‘‘other’’ pay-
ment models, thereby subjecting the ACO program in
its entirety to the law’s budget-neutrality test.
Under the proposed rule, an ACO can elect between
a one-sided or two-sided model, known as Track 1 and
Track 2, respectively.36 Track 1 nominally begins as a
basic shared savings approach, while Track 2 encom-
passes financial risk from the outset. Yet from its incep-
tion, Track 1 also creates financial risk beyond, of
course, the risks that any ACO incurs in deciding to in-
vest in formation. The first form of risk is liability for
risk of loss by Year Three, even in the shared savings
model. The second and equally serious risk of loss is a
25 percent withhold against the share of savings other-
wise due to Track 1 ACO participants, with no proce-
dures or timetable spelled out for calculating losses or
refunding the withheld amount in the event that losses
are avoided.37 Instead the regulation simply provides
that ‘‘[t]he withheld amount will be applied towards
[sic] repayment of an ACO’s losses.’’38 With no time-
table or recovery process, the length of time the govern-
ment can retain shared savings otherwise due is un-
clear; indeed, since Track 1 ACOs are not liable for
losses until year three, it is possible that retention of
savings could span years, costing ACOs financing that
presumably will be needed to offset initial investment
costs.
Third, all ACOs (whether Track 1 or Track 2) must
obtain reinsurance, place funds in escrow, obtain surety
bonds, establish a line of credit or maintain another
‘‘appropriate repayment mechanism in order to ensure
repayment of any losses to the Medicare program in ad-
vance of entering into a period of participation in the
Shared Savings Program under the two-sided model,’’39
with un-repaid losses carried forward into future
years.40 Presumably a Track 1 ACO would need to se-
cure financial backing either before or soon after initi-
ating its agreement, given the risk-of-loss requirement
by year three.
In sum, rather than implementing the statute as a
choice between the basic payment model and an
‘‘other’’ model involving financial risk of loss, the pro-
posed rule uses a payment structure that creates finan-
cial risk in both models, compelling shared losses by
year three and withholding shared savings otherwise
due to a Track 1 ACO for an indefinite time period. Be-
cause both models are essentially ‘‘other payment’’
models, they presumably would both be subject to the
budget neutrality requirements of the statute.
ACO size and maturity, including quality measure-
ment, performance, and reporting. The statute itself
contemplates ACOs of considerable size, since the law
establishes a 5,000 patient minimum. The CMS rule fur-
ther emphasizes size and strength by imposing risk of
loss requirements on all ACOs and by establishing per-
formance requirements that include extensive quality
performance reporting and a requirement that 50 per-
cent of all primary care physicians be meaningful users
of electronic health records.41 This final requirement is
particularly significant given the nascence of EHR
adoption as of 2012 when ACOs are to become certified
and begin operations. Essentially the rule uses the in-
centives created by the ACO statute to further leverage
extensive quality reporting, along with broad-based
EHR adoption and meaningful use. These requirements
apply to ACOs of all sizes, not only the largest entities.
The proposed rule favors size and maturity in other
ways. First, the greatest opportunities for shared sav-
ings inure to ACOs capable of taking a risk of financial
loss from the outset (i.e., Track 2 ACOs).42 Second, the
proposed rule establishes considerable staffing require-
ments. For example, an ACO must employ a ‘‘full-time
senior’’ medical director43 who is physically present in
an ACO location and must have substantial manage-
ment capabilities.44 The model envisioned by
Congress—at least 5,000 Medicare patients—thus has
(inevitably perhaps) led to an agency implementation
approach that emphasizes size, strength, and financial
maturity.
ACO participation and patient assignment. Taking a
broad approach to its statutory powers, the proposed
rule enables broad participation in ACOs.45 At the same
time, the proposed rule takes a narrow approach to the
question of assignment of Medicare beneficiaries, ex-
cluding as assignable all Medicare beneficiaries who re-
ceive primary care through individual health profes-
sionals other than physicians, as well as patients who
receive care through clinical care teams, one of whose
members is a physician.46
The exclusion of potentially millions of beneficiaries
from ACO assignable status is in one sense an out-
growth of the terms of the statute, which defines assign-
ment based on ‘‘utilization of primary care services by
35 See discussion in the IRS Notice, cited n. 7, supra, pp.
2-6.
36 42 C.F.R. § 425.5(d)(6)(A) and 425.7(c).
37 42 C.F.R. § 425.5(d)(6)(iii).
38 Id.
39 42 C.F.R. § 425.5(d)(6)(iv).
40 42 C.F.R. § 425.5(d)(6)(vi).
41 42 C.F. R. § 425.11(b).
42 42 C.F.R. § 425.7(d).
43 42 C.F.R. § 425.5(d)(9)(iii).
44 42 C.F.R. § 425.5(d)(9)(ii).
45 42 C.F. R. § 425.5(b).
46 Sara Rosenbaum and Peter Shin, Medicare’s Account-
able Care Organizations: How Will Medicare Beneficiaries
Who Reside in Medically Underserved Communities Fare?
http://www.gwumc.edu/sphhs/departments/healthpolicy/dhp_
publications/pub_uploads/dhpPublication_6EFAAA15-5056-
9D20-3DBE579D20C06F05.pdf (Accessed May 3, 2011).
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an ACO professional [who is a physician].’’47 But CMS
has interpreted the statute literally to reach only ser-
vices provided directly by a physician rather than the
provision of care in its fullest sense under state medical
practice law, which recognizes physicians as providers
of care when they have legal accountability for care un-
der state medical practice acts. The proposed rule also
excludes care arrangements in which nurse practitio-
ners and physician assistants share duties for the plu-
rality48 of primary care (as required under the law) in
partnership with a physician. As a result, the proposed
rule excludes patients cared for in nurse-managed clin-
ics, federally qualified health centers (FQHCs), and ru-
ral health clinics (RHCs) that together disproportion-
ately account for the care of millions of low-income and
medically underserved beneficiaries, whose Medicare-
sanctioned primary care models involve the use of
health care teams in order to overcome the problem of
primary care shortages.
Avoiding at risk beneficiaries. The problem of health
care organizational and payment models with the po-
tential to exacerbate rather than reduce health dispari-
ties is well recognized.49 The proposed rule defines the
term ‘‘at risk’’ beneficiaries relatively broadly, to in-
clude persons with high risk scores on the CMS risk ad-
justment model, persons considered high cost as a re-
sult of two or more hospitalizations each year, dual eli-
gible beneficiaries, beneficiaries with high utilization
patterns, and those with diagnoses expected to result in
high cost.50 Of particular concern are individuals who
are Medicare beneficiaries based on disability (these in-
dividuals presumably would be included as individuals
with anticipated high-cost diagnoses), as well as benefi-
ciaries who are viewed as clinically challenging because
of personal characteristics not related directly to a diag-
nosis (e.g., primary language other than English, per-
ceived low health literacy, mental disabilities that im-
pair cognition and thus the potential for compliance).
The CMS standards do not directly address this latter
group, nor does the proposed rule suggest monitoring
of beneficiaries who, having been notified of the ACO
participant status of their health care provider,51 de-
cline assignment or change physicians. A key question
may be the characteristics of patients who refuse to be
part of practices that, after all, are charged with paying
much greater attention to health care quality.
More importantly, perhaps, the proposed avoidance
rule is silent on what may be the most obvious way to
avoid at risk beneficiaries, namely by redlining certain
providers within the ACO’s primary service area out of
participant status by simply not inviting them in. This
problem of redlining has long been of concern in the
managed care network context,52 and while assignment
is not mandatory under the law, ACOs enjoy broad dis-
cretion to select their participants virtually without
oversight under equity standards. The monitoring regu-
lation indicates that the agency will look for ‘‘trends
and patterns suggestive of at-risk beneficiaries’’ using
techniques that consist of (i) analysis of specific finan-
cial and quality measurement data reported by the
ACO; (ii) site visits; (iii) analysis of beneficiary and pro-
vider complaints; and (iv) audits of claims, chart re-
views, and beneficiary surveys.53 No monitoring is sug-
gested for comparing ACO participants to potential par-
ticipants within the ACO’s primary service area, to
determine whether health professionals and clinics that
disproportionately treat more at-risk patients are
under-represented in an ACO’s network. The absence
of a more vigorous monitoring effort for selective inclu-
sion of participating professionals is not mitigated by
the fact that assignment is retrospective, since prospec-
tive or retrospective (an issue that has attracted consid-
erable debate and that is discussed extensively in the
proposed rule)54 the more significant risk-related ques-
tion for ACOs may be which providers get to participate
at all.
Review of agency action. As expected, the proposed
rule implements the bars to administrative and judicial
review while at the same time attempting to balance
this unilateral power to act against certain due process
considerations. Thus, the rule permits reconsiderations
of some but not all of the initial agency decisions that
can result in termination, suspension, or an order to re-
pay shared savings.55 Why certain actions merit a re-
consideration and others do not is not immediately ob-
vious. For example, findings of avoidance of high risk
beneficiaries can be taken to a reconsideration, while
the results of quality assessments cannot. Why one type
of action merits a second look and the other does not is
hardly evident.
The Proposed Statement of Antitrust
Enforcement Policy Regarding Accountable Care
Organizations Participating in the MSSP
In view of the agencies’ prior policy positions regard-
ing enforcement of antitrust laws in a health care con-
text, their proposed ACO policy statements are hardly
surprising, since CMS’s proposed ACO clinical integra-
tion standards parallel the indicia of clinical integration
identified under the agencies’ 1996 Statements and sub-
sequent rulings.56 Indeed, the proposed Statement ap-
pears to not only permit but encourage ACO formation,
thereby underscoring the agencies’ conclusion that in a
competitive health care system, the benefits of clinical
integration may be fairly said to outweigh the risks of
collusive financial behavior within a market.
In a departure from the prior Statements, the agen-
cies adopt a clear, prospective, and expedited approach
to agency review, a broad safety zone that makes re-
view technically unnecessary, and extension of the 1996
Safety Zones to multi-provider networks in which inde-
pendent ACO participants providing the same service
have a combined service share of less than 30 percent
of each ACO’s Primary Service Area (PSA).57 Limita-
47 § 1899(c).
48 42 C.F.R. § 425.6(b)(5).
49 Craig E. Pollack and Katrina Armstrong, Accountable
Care Organizations and Health Disparities, 305 JAMA 16
(April 27, 2011) 1706-1707.
50 42 C.F.R. § 425.4.
51 42 C.F.R. § 425.6(c).
52 Sara Rosenbaum and Joel Teitelbaum, Civil Rights En-
forcement in the Modern Health Care System: Reinvigorating
the Role of the Federal Government in the Aftermath of Alex-
ander v Sandoval, 3 Yale Jour. Health Pol. L. & Ethics 215
(2002).
53 42 C.F.R. § 425.12(a) and (b).
54 76 Fed. Reg. 19565-19566.
55 42 C.F.R. §§ 425.14 and 15.
56 These rulings are reviewed in Taylor and Rosenbaum, su-
pra, note 34.
57 76 Fed. Reg. 28197 (April 19, 2011).
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tions on ACO demands for participant exclusivity apply
to ‘‘dominant’’ providers (those with more than a 50
percent market share of any service that no other ACO
participant providers. At the same time, broad leeway is
given to physicians and hospitals that participate in ru-
ral ACOs and whose market share exceed the 30 per-
cent threshold for the safety zone to apply. Mandatory
review prior to CMS approval is required under the Pro-
posed Statement for ACOs that have a PSA share that
exceeds 50 percent of the common services that two or
more independent ACO participants provide within a
single PSA;58 at the same time, an agency can provide a
letter indicating that it has no present intention to chal-
lenge the ACO or to recommend such a challenge, and
approval.59
The Proposed Statement also addresses situations in
which the ACO’s market percentage falls between 30
percent and 50 percent of common services provided by
two or more independent participants. Even here, the
Proposed Statement permits ACO approval to move for-
ward without Agency review.60 ACOs whose partici-
pants’ share of common services within their PSA fall
within this market share range are advised to refrain
from engaging in certain types of conduct in order to
avoid review: attempting to steer payers away from
other providers; tying sales of the ACO’s services to the
purchase of certain other non-ACO services; attempting
to enter into exclusive specialty contracting arrange-
ments; trying to restrict a payer’s ability to disclose
quality and cost data; and sharing competitive informa-
tion inappropriately among ACO members.61
Issues Related to Tax-Exempt Status and Fraud
and Abuse
The Treasury Department and the OIG policies simi-
larly reflect a favorable view regarding the formation
and operation of ACOs.
Tax policy. After reviewing a series of comparable
situations dealing with inurement and benefit to private
parties as well as unrelated income, the IRS signals its
support for nonprofit involvement in ACOs without fear
of loss of Section 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status. The IRS
Notice states that ‘‘[b]ecause of CMS regulation and
oversight of the MSSP, as a general matter the IRS ex-
pects that it will not consider a tax-exempt organiza-
tion’s participation in the MSSP through an ACO to re-
sult in inurement or impermissible private benefit to the
provide party ACO participants.’’62 The Notice sets
forth steps that ACOs can take to assure favorable IRS
response, including the use of arms length agreements,
CMS approval of the ACO, assuring that the organiza-
tion’s share of economic benefits derived from the ACO
is proportional to its contributions and assuring that its
share of losses does not exceed the share of benefits to
which it is entitled from the ACO.63
Furthermore, the IRS notes that ‘‘absent inurement
or impermissible private benefit,’’ MSSP payments
would be consistent with the entity’s charitable purpose
of ‘‘lessening the burdens of government within the
meaning of Treasury rules.’’64 The IRS does leave the
door open to a finding of unrelated business income de-
rived from negotiations with private payers, because in
its view, these negotiations are not related to the MSSP;
even so, the agency specifically notes that participation
in a Medicaid shared savings program would constitute
related income because they share the MSSP charitable
purpose of lessening the burden on government.
Fraud and abuse laws. CMS and the OIG propose to
waive application of provisions of the physician self re-
ferral and anti-kickback laws to permit distribution of
shared savings among the participants. At the same
time, the agencies are clear that exchange of payments
outside the boundaries of the ACO in the context of self
referrals, kickbacks, and gainsharing, will receive a far
different level of scrutiny.65 As with the antitrust en-
forcement agencies’ willingness to tolerate large, multi-
practice networks with significant market presence, the
CMS/OIG position suggests the agencies’ emphasis on
the formation and operation of broadly inclusive ACOs
whose reach spans the full spectrum of primary and
specialty health care. Throughout the proposed waiver
policy the agencies draw the line at distributions out-
side the scope of an ACO’s participant group itself, un-
less the payments are for ‘‘activities necessary for and
directly related to the ACO’s participation in and opera-
tions under’’ the MSSP. This concept remains unde-
fined in the law, and presumably the burden falls on the
ACO to make such a showing. How ACOs will know
what such a showing entails in the absence of further
definitional regulation or more extensive sub-
regulatory guidance is unclear.
Conclusion
Taken as a whole, the Administration’s policies on
ACO formation and operation, both within the MSSP
and beyond, suggest a high eagerness on its part to
move ACOs forward, but with a strong orientation—at
least in the early phases of the program—toward large,
mature entities that from the outset are capable of tak-
ing risk of both loss and reward. By building risk into
the MSSP program through the use of withholds and ul-
timate acceptance of risk of loss even among Track 1
ACOs, the proposed MSSP rule effectively eliminates
the very payment model that was assumed by Congress
to be the basic approach to the program, one that uses
the standard fee-for-service payment system coupled
with bonus payments to ACOs whose expenditures beat
their benchmark.
Also evident is the MSSP rule’s policy tilt toward net-
works comprised of ‘‘traditional’’ primary care practice
arrangements, meaning physicians. Although clinics in
rural and urban underserved areas and nurse-led prac-
tices can participate, the proposed MSSP rule’s strict
construction of the term ‘‘provide’’ effectively excludes
from ACO networks all Medicare patients whose pri-
mary care—no matter how high quality—might be con-
sidered non-traditional. Since these patients dispropor-
tionately may be lower income and medically under-
served persons, with a higher likelihood of dual
Medicare/Medicaid enrollment, the policy ironically
may perpetuate the very avoidance of high risk patients
that CMS seeks to deter.
58 Id.
59 76 Fed. Reg. 28198 (April 19, 2011).
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 IRS Notice 2011-20.
63 Id.
64 Id. pp. 7-8.
65 76 Fed. Reg. 19655 (April 7, 2011).
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Similarly absent is any policy for addressing avoid-
ance techniques that entail the avoidance of high risk
patients through the avoidance of their providers. The
lack of any strategy for addressing redlining of poten-
tial ACO participants is notable, since this type of prac-
tice that has long been a focus of concern in networked
efficiency models and among civil rights experts.
The proposed MSSP regulation’s policy toward big-
ger, stronger, and more mature physician group prac-
tices that tend not to serve underserved and low income
patients in large numbers stands in contrast, perhaps,
to the FTC/DOJ policy of inclusion and incentivization
that encourage smaller practices that band together to
form networks, even networks that surpass a certain
size threshold in historically underserved communities.
Similarly, the IRS rule on nonprofit involvement seem-
ingly encourages ACO entry by charitable hospitals that
possess relatively strong track records of reaching
lower income and medically underserved patients
through partnerships with FQHCs and RHCs. What
happens to these partnerships in the wake of exclusion
of their patients from assignable status is unclear.
Finally, the OIG/CMS proposed standards for waiving
the federal fraud laws emphasizes ACOs of consider-
able size and scope, spanning the full range of primary
and specialty care practices and capable of sharing sav-
ings within the ACO rather than over the corporate
‘‘wall’’ surrounding the ACO.
How these broad policies complement or contrast
with one another, and how strongly they collectively
nudge the health care system down the road of full in-
tegration, will be one of the most closely watched ques-
tions for health policy researchers in the years ahead.
8
5-16-11 COPYRIGHT  2011 BY THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC. HCPR ISSN 1068-1213
